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The essays that comprise CARGC Briefs Volume I: ISIS Media began their lives as presentations at a small, by-
invitation workshop, “Emerging Work on Communicative Dimensions of Islamic State,” held on May 3-4,
2017 at the Center for Advanced Research in Global Communication at the Annenberg School for
Communication.
Consistent with CARGC’s mission to mentor early-career scholars, the workshop was a non-public event
featuring graduate students, some affiliated with the Jihadi Networks of Communication and CultureS
( JINCS) research group at CARGC, and others from around the United States and the world, in addition to
postdocs and faculty members. Parameters were purposefully broad to encourage independent thought and
intellectual exploration: contributors were asked to write short essays focusing on any single aspect of Islamic
State that was part of their research.
The result is a group of fascinating essays: using mostly primary sources (textual, visual, or audio-visual),
examining several media platforms and modalities, considering multiple levels of theoretical deployment and
construction, and shedding light on various aspects of Islamic State communication against the broad back
drop of history, ideology and geopolitics, the following include some of the most innovative approaches to
Islamic State to date, and promise a wave of fresh voices on one of the most important challenges to global
order.
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Much of the research on Islamic State’s 
communication and media operations has 
emerged from a counter-terrorism framework. 
Under the impetus of my 2016 Andrew Car-
negie Fellowship. “The War Machine in the 
Age of Global Communication,” the Center 
for Advanced Research in Global Commu-
nication established a research group, Jihadi 
Networks of Communication and CultureS 
(JINCS), consisting of PhD students, Postdoc-
toral Fellows, and faculty from the Annenberg 
School for Communication, the University of 
Pennsylvania, and elsewhere. 
During the 2016-2017 academic year, 
JINCS hosted external speakers, discussions, 
and meetings that culminated in a small, 
by-invitation workshop, “Emerging Work on 
Communicative Dimensions of Islamic State,” 
held on May 3-4, 2017 at CARGC World 
Headquarters in Philadelphia. The essays that 
follow all began their lives as presentations at 
that workshop. Full scholarly versions will be 
published in a special journal issue co-pub-
lished by CARGC Press and the International 
Journal of Communication.
Launched as the Project for Advanced Re-
search in Global Communication (PARGC) 
in 2013, the Center for Advanced Research 
in Global Communication at the Annenberg 
School for Communication at the Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania produces and promotes 
scholarly research on global communication 
and public life. As an institute for advanced 
study dedicated to global media studies, we 
revisit enduring questions and engage press-
ing matters in geopolitics and communica-
tion. Our vision of “inclusive globalization” 
recognizes plurality and inequality in global 
media, politics, and culture. Our translocal 
approach fuses multidisciplinary regional 
knowledge with theory and methodology in 
the humanities and social sciences. This syn-
thesis of deep expertise and interdisciplinary 
inquiry stimulates critical conversations about 
entrenched and emerging communicative 
structures, practices, flows, and struggles. We 
explore new ways of understanding and ex-
plaining the world, including public scholar-
ship, algorithmic culture, the arts, multi-mod-
al scholarship, and digital archives. With a 
core commitment to the development of early 
career scholars worldwide, CARGC hosts 
postdoctoral, doctoral, undergraduate, and 
faculty fellows who collaborate in research 
groups, author CARGC Press publications, 
and organize talks, lectures, symposia, con-
ferences, and summer institutes.
It is within this vision that JINCS ought to be 
understood as a space that would spark and 
nurture original scholarly contributions that 
grasp the communicative activities of Islamic 
State and other radical groups from a broad 
multi-disciplinary perspective, encompass-
ing the humanities and social sciences. Of 
particular importance to me was to eschew 
the rather simplistic focus on specific media 
platforms or gadgets, and to consider Islam-
ic State’s communications as mediations that 
entail political, ideological, religious, military, 
social and cultural dimensions, that overlap 
and intertwine, against a broad geopolitical 
backdrop that transcends the Middle East to 
include the global commercial media system 
and its own articulation with electoral politics, 
security policies, and spectacular images.
This is guided by a broad conceptual frame-
work that I have been developing in my 
own work that defines Islamic State as a 
war machine, with military, communicative 
and governance dimensions. Neither only a 
state building enterprise nor merely a terrorist 
group that stages attacks worldwide, which is 
how many analysts cast a spurious dichotomy 
between Islamic State and al-Qaeda, a war 
machine is a mercurial, shape-shifting entity 
that blends guerilla tactics with conventional 
military warfare, traditional low- tech and 
mid-tech propaganda with digital blitzkrieg, 
and a central territorial base combined with 
a global reach.
Introduction: Emerging Work on Communicative Dimensions of Islamic State
ISIS Media
 CARGC BRIEFS 2019
 VOLUME I
 Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania 2
Marwan M. Kraidy
Professor of Communication
The Anthony Shadid Chair in Global Media, 
Politics & Culture
Director, Center for Advanced Research in 
Global Communication (CARGC)
@MKraidy
In doing so, Islamic State has developed a 
media doctrine, which I argued enacts a dual 
spectacle of life and death to induce what I 
called a “global networked affect” of terror: 
a sentiment, spread by global networks, that 
combines fear and anxiety, and enters circuits 
of circulation in security, anti-immigrant, and 
multicultural discourses in the West and else-
where.1
Consistent with CARGC’s mission to mentor 
early-career scholars, this small, by-invita-
tion only, workshop was a non-public event 
featuring graduate students, some affiliated 
with JINCS and CARGC at the Annenberg 
School for Communication at Penn, others 
from around the United States and the world, 
in addition to postdocs and faculty members. 
Parameters were purposefully broad to en-
courage independent thought and intellectual 
exploration: contributors were asked to write 
short essays focusing on any single aspect of 
Islamic State that was part of their research. 
The result is a group of fascinating essays: 
using mostly primary sources (textual, visual, 
or audio-visual), examining several media 
platforms and modalities, considering multi-
ple levels of theoretical deployment and con-
struction, and shedding light on various as-
pects of Islamic State communication against 
the broad back drop of history, ideology and 
geopolitics, the following include some of the 
most innovative approaches to Islamic State 
to date, and promise a wave of fresh voices 
on one of the most important challenges to 
global order.2
NOTES
1. This has included Kraidy, M. M. (2017) Revisiting Hypermedia Space in the Era of Islamic 
State, The Communication Review, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10
714421.2017.1343601; Kraidy, M. M. (2017) The Projectilic Image: Islamic State’s Digital 
Visual Warfare and Global Networked Affect, Media, Culture & Society (2017, in press); 
Kraidy, M. M. (2017, February 9). This is Why the Islamic State Shocks the World with its 
Graphically Violent Imagery, The Monkey Cage, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/09/this-is-why-the-islamic-state-shocks-the-world-
with-its-graphically-violent-imagery/?postshare=8391486648976374&tid=ss_tw&utm_
term=.28f001bb6c8d; and Kraidy, M. M. (2017). Terror, Territoriality, Temporality: 
Hypermedia Events in the Age of Islamic State, Television and New Media, online first 
(March 23, 2017).
2. This set of essays was originally published online in conjunction with global-e  (UC Santa 
Barbara, https://www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/global-e-series/isis-media). 
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The ability of the Islamic State (IS) to gain virtual and literal ground in terms of recruitment 
throughout the world is very much linked to its politics of sentimentality. The militant group 
appears to be creating, through the romanticization of the Caliphate, a type of (virtual and 
actual) space where a sense of community reigns. By using affect in their appeals, the IS 
promises its recruits a chance to depart from mundane daily life to participate in something 
bigger and supposedly better. The spokesman for the Islamic State, Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-
‘Adnani ash-Shami, proclaimed when declaring the establishment of the Caliphate that:
The time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, 
being nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people, 
after their long slumber in the darkness of neglect—the time has come for them to 
rise. The time has come for the ummah of Muhammad (peace be upon him) to wake 
up from its sleep, remove the garments of dishonor, and shake off the dust of humil-
iation and disgrace, for the era of lamenting and moaning has gone, and the dawn 
of honor has emerged anew. The sun of jihad has risen. The glad tidings of good are 
shining. Triumph looms on the horizon. The signs of victory have appeared.1
This statement demonstrates the IS’s aim to appeal to a form of victimhood that conceives itself 
as having been treated unjustly, as having been marginalized and abused by the West. As 
such, the IS claims to offer the disenfranchised—who see no way to live in honor in the West—a 
chance to reinvent themselves as heroes in the IS’s dystopic reality. It does so by concocting 
fantasies of belonging that are presented in the form of relief from what is experienced in the 
lived real.
In one of the more popular videos titled “There is No Life without Jihad,” stirring images appear 
as the audience follows the story of Muhammad, a young Syrian battling internal melancholy 
at the state of affairs in his country. The video is measured and sober in both tone and content: 
no gruesome decapitations are featured; no kidnappings, sex slaves, or bloodshed is visible. 
On the contrary, the video expertly targets real grievances by its depiction of Muhammad’s 
helplessness in the face of a crumbling world. The viewer follows Muhammad into an IS 
recruitment office where he meets a community of people who believe in the same cause and 
are going through the same internal struggle and who are there to offer guidance, support and 
salvation. As the story unfolds, it seems that the only way out of the darkness for Muhammad 
(and his likes) is by joining the Caliphate. This is an example of what Laurent Berlant calls the 
“intimate public,” a space and place that is sheltered from “social antagonisms, exploitation, 
compromised intimacies, and the attrition of life.”2  An “intimate public” exists in a juxta-political 
safe world where various narratives are transformed into one.3 As such, the intimate public 
created by the IS circulates general themes of suffering, humanity, and victimhood with which 
identification is possible regardless of a person’s religion or whether they have experienced 
the exact same kind of suffering as their fellow “comrade.” Instead it is individuals’ diverse 
experiences of suffering and victimization that converse with one another in this intimate public.
Yara M. Damaj
Doctoral Student, 
Department of Political 
Science, University of 
Pennsylvania
ydamaj@sas.upenn.edu 
Citation: 
Damaj, Yara M. Fatal 
Attraction: The Islamic 
State’s Politics of 
Sentimentality. CARGC 
Brief 1. Philadelphia, 
USA: CARGC Press.
Fatal Attraction: The Islamic State’s Politics of 
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ISIS Media
 CARGC BRIEF 1 2019
 Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania 4
Slavoj Žižek wrote that “the function of ideology is not to offer us a point of escape from our 
reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape.”4  Indeed, IS recruitment strategies 
call on people to “choose happiness over misery” by joining the ranks of the Caliphate, so 
in a way, a different “social reality” becomes itself the escape for the IS recruit. Indeed, the 
general feel of the “There is no Life without Jihad” video that features young Muhammad is 
that the Islamic State extends camaraderie and the possibility of heroic activity. Such strategies 
are commented on by J.M. Berger, who claims that the easier recruits for the Islamic State 
are individuals who feel insufficient, humiliated, disrespected, full of untapped potential and 
insatiable ambitions, who are angry at perceived or real injustices and are therefore looking 
for an entity to blame for their struggles.5 In this sense, the video supports a potential recruit’s 
grievances and ultimately introduces or reinforces the idea that the source of their angst is 
outside themselves.
Additionally, one of Dabiq magazine’s articles reads that “[the] revival of the Khilāfah gave 
each individual Muslim a concrete and tangible entity to satisfy his natural desire for belonging 
to something greater.”6  This type of summons functions through the creation of a sense of 
community to which Muslims belong, a community that protects itself regardless of whether 
the individual members of that community have actually met face-to-face. It can be said 
that a virtual intimate public is concocted and later actualized upon hijrah (migration) to the 
Khilafa. This is precisely the appeal of the IS, in that it allows its adherents to negotiate a form 
of belongingness to a world in which they are not only seen, but recognized and called upon. 
The Muslim victim as such becomes a symbol for general victimhood, so that no matter what 
potential recruits’ grievances are, they are able to identify with the suffering of the Muslim victim. 
In turn, this identification is made possible through the intimate public where belongingness is 
solicited using sentimentality, which binds together the various experiences of its audience into 
one narrative that is emotionally encompassing and generalizable to each individual case.7 
An “intimate 
public” exists in 
a juxta-political 
safe world where 
various narratives 
are transformed into 
one.
Screen grab from video ‘There is No Life Without Jihad’
ISIS Media
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The intimate public focuses recruits’ personal narratives on “identification with the suffering, 
endurance, and sacrifice”8 of Muslim peoples and thereby places more emphasis on the 
concepts of humanity and suffering than on Islamic tradition. As such, a picture of Muslim 
humanity emerges from the existential reality derived from a common suffering that is 
identifiable. This is what the proclamation of the Caliphate aimed at depicting: an identified 
victimhood that belongs somewhere and whose suffering is not only recognized, but will 
eventually be alleviated as it reaches “honor” and “victory.”
These strategies confirm the observation made by Berlant, who argues that individuals have 
an “expressed desire to be somebody in a world where the default is being nobody or, worse, 
being presumptively all wrong.”9  In a sense, the intimate public thrives by creating an emotional 
connection that produces a sense of relief and an answer to the persistent internal struggles of 
individual recruits. This emotional connection is actualized by the creation of a “market domain 
where a set of problems associated with” being righteous and Muslim in this moment in history 
arises. The term “market” employed by Berlant in her analysis refers to commodities (videos, 
books, articles etc.) being circulated with the aim of enabling a sort of “emotional generality” 
regardless of the “diverse historical locations of the readers and the audience, especially of 
class and race.”10 
Indeed, IS propaganda tools such as recruitment videos and their Dabiq and Rumiyah 
magazines (among others) are prime examples of disseminated commodities that illicit in some 
readers a feeling of identification or belonging that they cannot find elsewhere. As such the 
“generic-but unique”11 struggle of each becomes identifiable with others in this interwoven 
intimate public by creating a “sentimental subject” who “is connected to others who share 
the same sense that the world is out of joint, without necessarily having the same view of the 
reasons or solutions.”12 Berlant argues that sentimentality centers around the imaginary of “the 
good life” and that it works together with a view of the world that justifies people’s feelings as 
containing a wisdom about the world that could make it better.13 So for dispossessed people 
struggling with the increasing pressure of the present historic moment and its alienating factors, 
IS proposes a simplistic narrative that makes a life of sacrifice seem sensible.
The intimate public 
thrives by creating 
an emotional 
connection that 
produces a sense of 
relief and an answer 
to the persistent 
internal struggles of 
individual recruits.
ISIS spokesman Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani ash-Shami
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NOTES
1. “The Return of Khilafah.” Dabiq, July 5, 2014, 3. 
2. Lauren Berlant, The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American 
Culture (Duke University Press, 2008), 6. 
3. Ibid, 1-13. 
4. Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (Verso, 2008), 76. 
5. Jessica Stern & J.M Berger, “ISIS and the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon,” The Atlantic, March 
8, 2015; J.M. Berger, “How we Underestimated ISIL,”  Politico, November 15, 2015.
6. “The Extinction of the Grayzone,” Dabiq, February 12, 2015, 57. 
7. Berlant, The Female Complaint, 5.  
8. Faisal Devji, “The Terrorist as Humanitarian.” Social Analysis 53, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 
174.
9. Berlant, The Female Complaint, 3.
10. Ibid, 5 
11. Ibid, 6 
12. Ibid, 21 
13. Ibid, 21-22
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Daesh media production is complex, multifaceted, and is arguably a representational 
microcosm of the organization as a whole. Claiming universality as an Islamic State for the 
entire Muslim Umma, debates about its statehood status continue without clear resolution. In this 
essay I argue that, rather than a proto-state, a failed state, or a functioning state, Daesh isn’t a 
state at all in the normal sense; it is an incompletestate. By analyzing infographics published in 
issues 10-74 of the Arabic language al-Naba’ magazine, issued by Daesh between December 
19, 2015 and March 30, 2017, we can think more deeply about this incomplete statehood, and 
how these infographics try to patch it over. The subject at hand is at the crux of studies of jihadi 
media use and debates about the nature of the state. 
Expanding historical scholarship on Daesh has removed any mystery behind the group’s origins 
and shows how the genesis of Daesh contributes to this emphasis on statecraft. Daesh has been 
shown in numerous scholarly works to have arisen from Zarqawi’s faction that broke away 
from Al-Qaeda, changing names several times in the 2000’s before becoming “ISIS” and then 
“IS” in their own parlance.1 Zarqawi was intent on seizing and governing territory as well as 
establishing a caliphate, something Bin Laden and Zawahiri came to view as a mistake that 
they counseled Zarqawi and others against. After shocking the world with its “success” in 2014, 
Daeshi’s claim to statehood was not only not recognized by other nation-states, but they also 
refused to call it the “Islamic State.” Daesh thus saw its aspirations doubted by other jihadis 
before even moving to realize them, and saw a complete refusal by the West to acknowledge 
its statehood after the declaration of the Caliphate. 
While Daesh may be relatively new and its publication al-Naba’ even younger, previous 
iterations of Daesh had already been making propaganda for years, as had their close 
organizational cousins Al-Qaeda.2 The group expanded media efforts from 2011-2014 and 
founded multiple new outlets that shape what we talk about when we focus on Daesh media in 
2017.3 These include the founding of al-Naba’, Amaq News Agency, Telegram channels, and 
the al-Bayan radio station. In al-Naba’, we see attempts to display the most basic element of 
statehood: the monopoly over the coercive use of violence. The overwhelming majority of the 
content in my sample of Daesh media consulted for this research depicts violence or reports the 
carrying out of violent punishments and attacks. The group’s propaganda used to be directed 
inward at its followers, but it also now seeks to terrorize non-Muslims most broadly. Infographics 
about statecraft seek to prove wrong those who doubted Daesh, while reinforcing the paternal 
and nurturing aspects of the state.
States traditionally want to control education and the narratives taught in schools, and Daesh is 
no exception. An infographic from March 2016 claimed that some 43,000 people took shari‘a 
courses over the previous 6 months in Daesh territories in Syria. (Graphic 1, below) Another 
measures a full year from mid-2015 through mid-2016 in Iraqi provinces, totaling 2,500 
classes and lectures, while curiously not providing documentation of the number of students 
who attended such classes. (Graphic 2, below) Defectors describe being forced to take these 
courses. A different facet of education relates to public awareness; Daesh created multiple 
Michael Degerald, PhD
University of Washington, 
PhD in Interdisciplinary Near 
and Middle Eastern Studies 
(2018)
mdegerald@gmail.com
 
Citation: 
Degerald, Michael. 
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CARGC Press. 
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public “media points” where citizens could access all of the group’s digital productions—in 
short, to make the propaganda it spread online reach more of the audience on the ground 
inside of war-ravaged Iraq and Syria. Daesh sought and largely achieved complete control 
over media and education in their territories.
Infographics in al-Naba’ in early 2017 purported to quantify the number of medical services 
provided through eight hospitals under Daesh rule in and around Mosul. Daesh claimed to have 
provided 487,163 consultations, 185,065 natural births, 133,409 sick patients treated, 155,049 
ambulance rides, and 103,134 surgeries—numbers that are impossible to corroborate. (Graphic 
3) A graphic about medical services in Syrian provinces also emphasized the tens of thousands 
of free services provided. (Graphic 4, below) These infographics neglect to mention having 
to issue an ultimatum to doctors to return after many fled Daesh rule. They also fail to mention 
that Daesh acknowledged that some people must be allowed leave its territory for medical 
treatment, and that it made an exemptionfor this; otherwise, leaving the territory is equated 
with apostasy. Such exemptions were not treated lightly, as a car or land had to be offered as 
collateral in case the sick person didn’t return. Infographics about education and health services 
both attempt to paint a smooth picture of services working for citizens, not a public sector shot 
through with holes from defections and incapable of meeting everyone’s needs. Its aspirations 
to ‘statehood’ compel Daesh to emphasize its paternal role in protecting and caring for its 
citizens, but it cannot show them the full reality, only a stage-managed version.
While much has been made about Daesh exporting oil through illicit networks to fund its 
activities, the organization cannot survive financially on oil revenues alone. Tax collection 
figures in al-Naba’ show revenues from al-zakat, an Islamic duty of Muslims to help those in 
Infographics about 
statecraft seek to 
prove wrong those 
who doubted Daesh, 
while reinforcing 
the paternal and 
nurturing aspects of 
the state.
Graphic 3: “Medical services in Ninawa 
Province in the year 1437” al-Naba’ no. 69
Graphic 6: “Statistics for the first half of 1437 for 
some provinces of the Islamic State” al-Naba’ 
no. 31
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need. Effective tax collection is understood as a central element of a strong state more broadly.4 
An infographic from mid-2016 shows statistics for Wilayat Tarablus, the former Tripoli region in 
Libya, where Daesh claimed that it had distributed more than $878,000 in charity over a three-
month period in early 2016. (Graphic 5, below) Another Daesh infographic claimed that the 
group has distributed more than $8,000,000 to more than 44,000 families in Syria. (Graphic 
6) Yet another graphic dealing with zakat emphasized its obligatory status, pushing citizens 
to see this as an Islamic duty rather than merely a state tax. (Graphic 7, below) Thus Daesh 
infographics about zakatattempt to demonstrate state capacity, readiness to help those in need, 
and religious bonafides.
Religious governance in territories controlled by Daesh falls under al-Hisba, the religious 
police, and various infographics in al-Naba’ attempted to quantify its effectiveness. Daesh 
shari‘a courts in Syria processed just under sixty-nine thousand cases in the space of six months. 
(Graphic 1) A graphic focusing on a one-month span in Syria showed that the majority of the 
Syrian cases were in Al-Raqqa. (Graphic 8) For this period between March and April of 2016, 
we get the most detailed breakdown: 31% of these cases are described as related to buying or 
selling during prayer times, 13% related to drugs or smoking, many to “various infractions” like 
wearing makeup or failing to veil the way Daesh decreed. Daesh claimed to have seized more 
than one million pills during a six-month period in Syrian provinces, as well as several hundred 
thousand cartons of cigarettes. (Graphic 1) Remarkably, Daesh quietly tolerated cigarette 
smuggling and later seized the profits from the smugglers themselves, as another source of 
revenue in hard times—the theme of controlling vice was quietly superseded by hard financial 
need. Still, the latent theme of infographics relating to religious vice, even if hypocritical, is that 
stability through rule of law is one of the most tangible benefits Daesh can offer after years of 
chaos.
Daesh thus saw its 
aspirations doubted 
by other jihadis 
before even moving 
to realize them, and 
saw a complete 
refusal by the West 
to acknowledge its 
statehood after the 
declaration of the 
Caliphate.
Graphic 8: “Statistics of Diwan al-Hisba in Sham provinces, 
month of Jamadi al-akhra of 1437” al-Naba’ no. 24
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The incomplete reality of Daesh media comes through in archival documents and in testimonies 
of defectors and others who have fled Daesh rule.5 Contrary to the image of competence 
that the organization seeks to display, Daesh has struggled with institutional brain drain as 
its violent system of rule drives away prospective talent. Extreme measures of “repentance” 
were implemented in which anyone who worked for the Syrian or Iraqi Ba‘ath governments 
was required to repent for their sin before being allowed to work for Daesh. This insistence on 
repentance seems to have exacerbated the brain drain problem, as I have argued elsewhere. 
Therefore, as this analysis has tried to show, even if statistics in the infographics are correct, they 
leave out key problems that change the picture regarding the capacities of these services and 
institutions. While extreme violence projects one facet of state power, the incompleteness of the 
Daesh ‘state’ renders it unable to fulfill other basic functions, which also include stable currency 
production or passport generation. In both of these respects Daesh remains dependent on other 
states, primarily Syria and Iraq. Daesh cannot manage a modern economy if it cannot print 
an internationally recognized currency through a central bank. Since the infographics under 
discussion here were published, Daesh has also lost significant territory, falling further from full 
statehood and struggling to hold onto what little remains. Daesh media attempt to elide this 
weakness with displays of strength, dominance, and competence, but the ‘Islamic State’ will 
remain an incomplete state at best even if it regains territory.
Graphic 1: “Statistics of Diwan al-Hisba in Sham 
provinces for the first half of 1437” al-Naba’ no. 
30   
Graphic 2: “Statistics of Diwan al-Hisba in Iraqi 
provinces for full year from June 2015-June 
2016” al-Naba’ no. 37 
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Graphic 4: “Medical Services in Sham Province 
for the year 1437 hijri” al-Naba’ no. 70
Graphic 5: “Statistics for the second quarter 
of 1437 Wilayat Tarablus” al-Naba’ no. 32  
Graphic 7: “Zakat is Obligatory” al-Naba’ 
no. 46
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On July 10, 2017, the Iraqi PM announced the liberation of the Daesh stronghold of Mosul after 
about nine months of fighting. The battle, however, was not limited to military action since Daesh 
was also waging war on the social media battlefield by visualizing the group’s resilience to its 
online followers, supporters, and fanboys. Daesh was in a quite similar position in 2007-2009 
as the surge of U.S. troops in Iraq along with Sunni tribal resistance rolled back the group’s 
physical presence, yet it managed to maintain an online presence and boost its statehood 
claims by declaring two ministry cabinets. Over the years, the group has successfully built a 
relatively robust propaganda infrastructure capable of disseminating content and promoting 
“Media Jihad” as equivalent to fighting in battle. The Mosul Operation posed a unique 
opportunity to gauge the extent to which Daesh could sustain a virtual warfare campaign under 
immense military pressure. 
Studies analyzing Daesh’s propaganda over the past three years show that still photographic 
imagery plays an integral role in Daesh’s propaganda mix.1 Daesh disseminates its imagery 
in provincial photo reports and multi-lingual publications. Studies examining Daesh’s 
visual propaganda mainly focus on the group’s English-language magazine, Dabiq. Some 
researchers have compared Dabiq to Rumiyah and al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine,2 while 
others have traced the origin of Dabiq imagery, analyzed the about-to-die visual trope,3 and 
categorized images by visual frames and/or purpose.4 The existing literature lacks analyses of 
Daesh’s imagery at the provincial level and the pictorial conventions it incorporates, including 
subjective-camera shots, camera angles, direct eye contact, and viewer distance. In this essay, 
I present preliminary findings of a content and visual framing analysis of images disseminated 
by Ninawa Province from the beginning of the operation on October 17, 2016 to the end of 
January 2017, when east Mosul was liberated. 
DAESH’S IMAGE-WEAPONRY
Daesh’s Ninawa Province disseminated a total of 1204 images, increasing from an average 
of 10 per day in late October to 14 per day in November and December, before dropping 
to seven per day in January. This imagery can be sorted into two main categories of military 
and non-military, which together are comprised of eight visual frames: combat, preparation, 
eulogy, law enforcement, social services, economy, natural landscape/cityscape, and media 
distribution. Military images account for about three-fourths of the total, while non-military 
images account for the remainder. In the sections below, I briefly describe the most common 
visual frames along with key the pictorial conventions that Daesh photographers utilized.
MILITARY
Combat and war spoils were the two most recurring visual frames. The former depicted Daesh 
militants setting out on suicide missions or in battle shooting, sniping, and firing rockets at Iraqi 
or Peshmerga forces. The latter also included photos of militants confiscating enemy weapons 
and belongings after battle. Combat and war spoils imagery significantly dropped from 
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November and December to January as the group was losing its grip on east Mosul. Over 
70% of low-angle shots in the overall collection appeared in combat images, looking up to 
Daesh militants in battle—a visual technique known to convey the symbolic power of the photo 
subject(s).5  By contrast, over one-third of all high-angle shots appeared in war spoils images, 
looking down on confiscated belongings to indicate the enemy’s loss and inferiority. Moreover, 
over half of all subjective shots appeared in these two frames, ranging from point-of-view to 
over-the-shoulder shots, hence embedding the viewer in the militant’s position as he fights with, 
snipes at, and walks over the bodies of Iraqi soldiers. These subjective perspectives are also 
employed to document the confiscation of the defeated soldiers’ belongings. Subjective shots 
are commonly used in first-person shooter games to promote viewer identification, prompt 
arousal responses, and foster presence in the scene. By plagiarizing from eminent popular 
culture images, Daesh targets youth by presenting its messaging in familiar, attractive visual 
tropes that stimulate embodiment and suggest perceptual alignment through a safe and virtual 
experience of action on the battlefield.
Eulogy images depicted Daesh “martyrs” before setting on suicide operations and they were 
often followed by long shots of explosions signalling the outcome. As the total liberation of 
east Mosul was in sight, eulogy images nearly doubled from November and December to 
January unlike the decreasing combat and war spoils images. Almost 90% of all instances 
of direct eye contact appeared in eulogy images, a visual technique often used to establish 
imaginary connection between photo subjects and the viewer by communicating what the 
former demands from the latter.6  This demand can be deciphered by examining the surrounding 
context, ranging from facial expressions, posture, and distance to other symbols. Eulogy images 
in Mosul typically position the militant at an intimate/personal distance (94%) with a confident 
smile (88%) to bolster the connection. The images show happy, confident, and determined 
young men—often pointing to the heavens signalling both monotheism and reward—who are 
engaging directly with the group’s supporters in demand of admiration, respect, and wishful 
identification. Taken together, Mosul eulogy images served as carriers of a trans-historical 
Daesh media imagery by type
ISIS Media
 CARGC BRIEF 3 2019
 Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania 15
martyrdom narrative that transforms an on-ground defeat into a symbolic victory, guided by “a 
sovereign imaginary that demands death over disobedience.” By disseminating more eulogy 
images when facing direct blows, not only did Daesh reframe the battle, but it also attempted to 
boost its moral superiority among its followers online.
NON-MILITARY
Non-military visual frames depicted the economy, social services, and urban and natural 
landscapes. Economy images presented Mosul as a prosperous city with vibrant markets, while 
social services highlighted service provision, such as electricity restoration, street cleaning, and 
education. These landscapes depicted the beauty and serenity of Mosul and the normalcy in its 
neighborhoods. Throughout the four-month period, one of these three visual frames appeared 
at least once daily. Mostly shot from a social/public distance, non-military images showed 
different types of scenes that were reportedly present in Mosul at the time. Taken together, 
scenes of prosperity, competence, and beauty aimed to give a sense of normalcy despite the 
ongoing battles.
The law enforcement visual frame portrayed the maintenance of order through hudud 
(punishments dictated by shari’a law) implementation and hisba (moral policing) activities. As 
the battle dragged on, law enforcement images doubled from December to January. The rise 
in law enforcement images suggests a sense of authority and control over the city as well as 
a commitment to implement shari’a law under any circumstances. Over 13% of all subjective 
shots appear in law enforcement images, embedding the viewer in the position of hisba agents 
reading the verdicts, punishing sinners, and destroying cigarettes and alcohol.
Daesh eulogy image
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WHAT’S NEXT?
The battle over east Mosul showed that military pressure did not eliminate Daesh’s 
propaganda during the first four months. Whereas military pressure hindered the production 
and dissemination of some visual frames, such as combat and war spoils, the dissemination 
of other frames, such as eulogy and law enforcement, ramped up amid intensified pressure. 
Daesh utilized eulogy as a narrative of ultimate victory, bringing destruction to the enemy, 
and happiness to the “martyr” in this life and the hereafter. By doing so, Daesh abandoned 
Hisba agent destroying a bottle of alcohol
Images of beauty and normalcy purporting to be Mosul & environs
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any visualization of victimhood in favor of portraits of young and old men, willingly choosing 
to die, to exemplify the concepts of sacrifice, devotion, and courage to the group’s followers. 
With more eulogy and law enforcement images, the group attempted to remodel its visual 
sphere during battle by appropriating two of the most powerful interpretive constructs in Islamic 
discourse, martyrdom and shari’a implementation, in order to create a picture of an epic battle 
between good and evil.
The social media battle will remain after Daesh loses its territories, and hence necessitates 
the development of nuanced and effective strategic communication campaigns in response. 
Although Daesh’s propaganda cannot be eliminated, its visual sphere can surely be disrupted 
and the underlying constructs rendering the group’s narrative powerful can be dismantled. 
Framing analysis allows us to understand the localized ingredients of Daesh’s visual sphere in 
which pictorial conventions constitute a powerful device to engage the viewer. By comparison, 
using Daesh’s own propaganda material and/or placing a talking head in front of the 
camera—whether a religious scholar or a grieving mother—puts counter-messaging campaigns 
at a disadvantage7compared to the engaging visual narratives Daesh utilizes. To best counter 
Daesh’s narrative, a more compelling and convincing story has to be created, one that can get 
the target audience involved in an overarching metanarrative and engaged with the depicted 
characters, while encapsulating a clear call for alternative action rather than inaction. In the 
context of the Mosul battle alone, for example, hundreds of Daesh members not only bought 
into the group’s narrative, but also decided to take their own lives by reportedly conducting 
over 480 suicide operations. Until strategic communication campaigns can embody a powerful 
metanarrative to compete with Daesh’s visual sway over the eyeballs of those who consider 
joining the group and/or engaging in violent action in their home countries, such efforts will be 
less likely to succeed.
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“In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful, the CyberCaliphate 
under the auspices of ISIS continues in its CyberJihad. While the US and its 
satellites kill our brothers in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan we broke into your 
networks and personal devices and know everything about you.”
- Threat from the ISIS group via hijacked CENTCOM (US military Central 
Command) Twitter account. Issued in 2015 as President Obama spoke to the FCC 
about stepping up cybersecurity efforts.
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Hijacking Heads & Hashtags
In the past few decades we have become increasingly familiar with the concept of 
cyberwarfare. More recently, however, we have also witnessed the rise of a new type of 
mediation, which could be understood as the mediated personalization of conflict. Popularized 
in the past few years, and largely in connection to the strategic digital efforts surrounding the 
group ISIS, this is a form of social media communication that bypasses traditional media and 
official bodies to target, instead, individual users at high speed and en masse. 
Hashtag hijacking, the focus of this essay, is one such tactic from ISIS’ strategic communication; 
it produces a spectacular clashing of texts, worlds, and audiences, and results in a 
disorientation and virtual encroachment of space. In turn, it gives unprecedented proximity 
to the phones, hands, eyes, and ears of ordinary people around the world who would not 
necessarily have had direct and immediate exposure to messages from such groups before. 
While some work does exist examining the weaponization of social media (Nissen, 2015), 
a more thorough reading of specific tactics would expand our understanding not only of the 
ISIS war machine (Kraidy, 2017) but also of the role of new media technologies and practices 
in today’s global conflicts. This essay first explores the idea of hijacking and then delves into 
examples of its practice.  
THE IDEA OF HIJACKING
Hijacking is not a new practice. Etymologically, the word hijack itself evokes a complex 
tale of global appropriation, embroiled in misunderstandings and mistranslation. By some 
accounts, hijack is a combination of the words “hi – jack” and is thought to have emerged 
as a euphemism during the American prohibition era as either a code word for prohibited 
alcohol use or, for US highway jackrolling, a compound word, for stealing cars (Clark, Y. in 
The Guardian, n.d.). By other accounts, the word emerged during the French revolution as a 
description of the frequent practice of robbing the rich “échaquer”, and was misunderstood 
and mispronounced by the English to morph into ‘hijack’ (Cryer, 2012). Échaquer as a word 
itself disappeared from use around this time and is said to have been replaced by the word 
détourner (Bowen, P. in The Guardian, n.d.), a term for ‘diversion’, later appropriated by the 
Situationists. Finally, “haiduk” is a popular Eastern European word for an outlaw, a freedom 
fighter in the Balkans or somewhat of a thief, which has since immigrated into the English 
vocabulary as ‘hijack’ (Burke, M. in The Guardian, n.d.).
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In short, ‘hijack’ has a number of suggested origins but quite fittingly, no known root. 
Nonetheless the curious point about translating the word hijack into the digital space today 
is that a hashtag or a textual meaning is not a tangible good that may be hijacked like a car. 
What gets hijacked by the ISIS group in these cases is not simply a hashtag but rather, public 
attention, a communicative space, and a particular meaning and social convention. Hashtag 
hijacking thus becomes a convenient portmanteau that is really about subverting attention and 
implicit communicative rules and spaces, as established by specific social groups.
Broadly speaking, textual hijacking can be understood as a tactic played out by a less powerful 
actor in order to use, manipulate, and divert the space and resources created by a more 
powerful one (de Certeau, 1984). In our context, the less powerful actor is ISIS, using social 
media as a mass channel and a way of circumventing traditional Western media and military 
organizations. Hijackers seize opportune moments and spaces to push messages and agendas 
to maximum effect. In essence, hijacking is a form of counterpower and can be situated 
amongst an older and wider array of practices of détournement and culture jamming (Debord, 
1967; Dery, 1993). 
THE PRACTICE OF HIJACKING 
Beginning in 2014, ISIS started targeting social media platforms and users by hijacking a 
variety of hashtags. Of course, this practice is only one among a much broader spectrum of 
the ISIS media spectacle, part of which is created and sustained by Twitter and the Western 
media themselves. As Twitter came under increasing pressure to react to the content on its 
platform, it systematically began to shut down ISIS Twitter accounts in late 2016 and there 
was a rapid decline in hashtag hijacking in the ensuing months. Nonetheless, the practice 
of hashtag hijacking remains—it just seems to have moved on to other platforms such as 
Telegram. Furthermore, the practice of digitally hijacking texts continues to be an insightful act of 
détournement, which is telling for the mediation of war today. 
Textual hijacking takes place through a diversion of social media platforms, topics, users and 
conventions. In some cases it is done by association, whereas in others it takes place through 
digital embodiment or through mass force. The latter is typically part of an algorithmic effort 
which employs the help of fake accounts and bots (more on this is mentioned later). Below are 
some examples of each of the main hijacking tactics on Twitter: event crashing and persona 
poaching. 
EVENT CRASHING
Event crashing exploits an existing, popular event hashtag, such as ISIS’ use of #WorldCup 
(See Image 1). The operational logic is that using popular event hashtags opens up new 
opportunities and audiences for ISIS’ messaging. In these cases, ISIS seizes upon diverse and 
popular social networks and gains attention through the shock and clash value of message 
juxtaposition.
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It is worth noting that the scale on which event crashing takes place varies. While #WorldCup is 
a rather global topic, much more localized hashtags have also been used to target, for instance, 
smaller communities around relatively unknown soccer teams. 
The selection of targeted hashtags itself became a spectacular event when the method was 
crowdsourced among ISIS supporters online and circulated by the mass media. A man under 
the name Abdulrahman al-Hamid asked his 4,000 plus followers on Twitter to help him find 
the highest trending topics in the UK; “We need those who can supply us with the most active 
hashtags in the UK. And also the accounts of the most famous celebrities. I believe that the 
hashtag of Scotland’s separation from Britain should be the first.” (translated from Arabic from 
the now suspended handle @Abu_Laila – in Malik, Laville, Cresci & Gani, 2014). 
PERSONA POACHING
ISIS has not only created new accounts but they have also literally embodied old ones, by 
hacking and hijacking passwords and thus, digitally seeping into the persona of another’s body. 
In turn, persona poaching includes diverting accounts or hashtags of people and organizations 
in the public spotlight such as #JustinBieber, Keith Richard (Rolling Stones), Tame Impala 
(Australian psychedelic band), and the US Central Command’s (USCC) Twitter accounts. (The 
latter three include hijacking accounts, whereas the former, Justin Bieber, includes only hashtag 
re-appropriation.)
The Tame Impala and Keith Richards digital efforts had some real impact as a number of 
airplanes had to be diverted because of ISIS-related Twitter threats.
Image 1. This image has been edited to hide a 
decapitated head that accompanied by the text “This 
is our ball… it is made of skin.” The account and post 
have since been deleted.
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In an interesting twist on persona poaching, a number of highly publicized counter-ISIS 
hashtags have emerged, like the ones below (See Images 4 and 5). Of course, as the saying 
goes, on the Internet nobody knows if you’re a dog, so issues of (re)presentation, authenticity, 
and validity haunt all digital practice and research (Kraidy, 2012), particularly when accounts 
and users are suspended, anonymized and frequently resurrected. ISIS’ online presence is 
largely a spectacle precisely for that reason—it is a reflection and a refraction of reality without 
necessarily being attached to a direct referent.
Images 4 employs a professionally framed screenshot, hashtag, and a play on words—but this 
account, like many others, has since been suspended. Image 5 is an example of a reversal 
to persona poaching practices, whereby somebody has posted under the counter hashtag 
#AMessagefromUStoISIS. The person posting under the Lord Stirling account is anonymous and 
so further adds to the fog around the ISIS media spectacle.
Image 2. #JustinBieber, and Image 3. Keith Richards -- account hacks
Images 4 and 5.
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It is worth noting that algorithmic buttressing in the form of fake accounts and bots is rife in the 
ISIS effort for maximum visibility. In fact, according to the 2015 ISIS Twitter Census (Berger & 
Morgan, 2015), around 20% of all ISIS Tweets come from bots or apps. These bots and apps 
help to rapidly disseminate ISIS Tweets and generate traffic, retweets, and higher algorithmic 
visibility on the Twitter platform itself. This implies that much of ISIS’ social media presence is 
algorithmically bolstered and thus, hashtag hijacking, event crashing, and persona poaching 
may also be understood as a product of technology and automation as much as of individual 
actors or organizations.
SUMMARY 
Hijacking serves to appropriate, re-appropriate and perhaps, mis-appropriate existing new 
media texts, communities and conventions. It causes a spectacular, mediated clashing of 
worlds, ideas and audiences; one that takes place at speed, en masse, and through increasingly 
personalized means. While the valence and media interest in ISIS’ hashtag hijacking has 
died down since 2016, studying this tactic provides an example of one communicative turn in 
modern warfare—a mediated spectacle that has the potential to storm into personal screens, 
communities, and spaces, thereby exercising a spectacular psychological power that often 
outshines reality. Still, studying these tactics opens some difficult ontological questions about 
conducting research online: how do we verify actors and acts, and to what extent can we 
reconcile this ‘reality’ with the digital, unverified, and mediated mirage that a majority of people 
experience?
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Terrorism and World Risk Society: Resilience, 
Resentment, and Spectacle
People living in Western societies are, for the most part, safer and healthier than at any point 
in human history. Despite this, the control and prevention of potential dangers is a central 
preoccupation of societal institutions. Which threats in particular are given the most attention 
by governments and media are often out of proportion to their actual likelihood of harm. Since 
9/11, Islamic terrorism has been characterized as the predominant security threat to the United 
States and Europe. The resulting “war on terror” drove changes in domestic and foreign policy 
and captured much media and public attention. That terrorism has been understood as the 
predominant social threat is not surprising given its immediate and visceral consequences. But a 
broader view of the social dynamics of risk can shed light on why terrorism and the reactions to 
it developed in the way they did. 
Terrorism is a category of danger that threatens society but it is also produced by society itself. 
As theorized by Ulrich Beck in his notion of the ‘risk society’, there is a shift in individual and 
public perceptions of the primary dangers we face from things like natural disasters or acts 
of god, which are outside of human control, to ones produced by human action.1 Along with 
terrorism, other examples include climate change, financial panic, and nuclear war. With 
the rise of such risks, the key concern of states has shifted from the provision and distribution 
of ‘goods’—income, housing, health care—to the avoidance of ‘bads’ like pollution, crime, 
terrorism. 
This preoccupation with risk comes not because of the actual dangers we confront. Rather, risks 
cause a problem for the legitimacy of governments and institutions, as modern nation-states 
based their legitimacy on their ability to control and protect their citizens from dangers. Now 
those dangers not only arise from society itself, but exceed the capabilities of social institutions 
to deal with them. One could therefore argue that terrorism represents a more immediate threat 
to state power and authority than something like climate change, and thus requires a stronger 
response. 
Government responses to risk are deployed strategically to strengthen state power. The 
representation of risks is inseparable from their material consequences, so how risks are defined 
and perceived is central to risk politics. In the case of terrorism, while the threat of terrorist 
attacks weakens trust in institutions, it can also strengthen states that have the most power 
to discursively define the terrorist threat. This discursive power has been used by Western 
governments to legitimize global military intervention and implement repressive domestic 
policies.2  In the post-9/11 years, the intense focus on avoiding a terrorist attack, and the 
ways this risk was constructed in official communications and media coverage, helped create 
a discursive environment in which far-reaching anti-terror laws could be enacted with limited 
opposition.3 
Governmental actions and policies generated in response to the risk of terrorism are in some 
cases associated with forms of neoliberal governmentality in which responsibility for dealing 
with risk is shifted from state institutions to individuals. The discourse around terrorism not only 
ISIS Media
 CARGC BRIEF 5 2019
 Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania 26
harnesses the fears of the public, it also “invites us to be involved in managing the terrorist risk 
as a logical step towards ensuring our own safe keeping.”4 Discourses encouraging citizens 
to play an active role in ensuring their security through self-monitoring and self-discipline are 
not unique to this historical moment. But the ways in which this is implemented is consistent with 
broader societal trends towards individualization and responsibilization under neoliberalism. In 
such formations, individuals rather than the state are primarily responsible for dealing with risks 
of all kinds and can be held accountable if they do not play their part.
More recently this has involved a discursive shift towards the concept of ‘resilience.’ This was 
embraced by the Obama administration, which in its counter-terrorism planning emphasized 
responding to and recovering from attacks as quickly as possible. A resilience approach 
accepts a certain degree of risk as inevitable, while boosting the capacity of individuals 
to respond in appropriate manner, for example through more first aid training for citizens 
or “[making] preparedness a civic virtue by instructing civilians to refrain from requesting 
professional assistance unless absolutely necessary.”5 Critics argue that resilience demands 
from citizens “permanent adaptability to extremes of turbulence.”6 Such shifts in discourse 
are of course politically contingent, with the Trump administration abandoning resilience in its 
counterterrorism rhetoric and focusing on eliminating the threat entirely.
The power to define risks does not rest solely with governments, however, and is in fact a key 
point of contestation. The global media landscape is contested and complex, used by both 
hegemonic powers and disruptive actors to advance their goals. Terrorist acts have long been 
intimately connected to media, with the attention gained through the creation of spectacular 
violent images part of the rationale for the attacks. Media are not simply how information about 
terrorism gets disseminated, but are an integral part of the events and how they are constituted.7 
This means that media themselves become a source of risk, with terrorists deliberately exploiting 
the media in order to cause reactions and overreactions on the part of the public and 
authorities.8 It is not only through reactions to terrorist attacks themselves that media become 
risky, but the ways they are used for the recruitment and organizing by terrorist groups.
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge -- March 2, 2002
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In the case of ISIS, the use of (Western, corporate) social media to organize and spread its 
message, as well as the usual terrorist logic of co-opting media practices to spread fear, are 
central to the successes that ISIS has achieved. While news media circulated images of the 
group’s acts of brutality, popular figures on social media emphasized the freedom and glory 
of life in the caliphate to attract foreign recruits to Syria. The openness and decentralization 
of ISIS propaganda, and its ease of access on common social media platforms, further 
encouraged followers to commit acts of terror in their home countries, multiplying and creating 
risks everywhere. ISIS documents promoted “Media Jihad” as central to its strategy, and other 
articles in this series have explored ISIS’ use of hashtag hijacking on Twitter and its visual 
propaganda techniques.
The role of media systems in actively producing the risk of terrorism point to the complex and 
reflexive nature of socially-produced risks in a globalized society. Responses to risks create 
new risks. While the discourses of terrorism that today circulate in the media can serve to 
reinforce the power of the state, these same processes can also amplify the risk of terrorism 
by fostering the conditions which spawn it. In a globalizing world, unintended consequences 
will inevitably arise from these new interconnections, which can negatively impact particular 
societies or groups. The failures of complex global political processes and institutions— 
many of which emerged in response to various risks—also resonate at an individual level. 
The paradigm of resilience positions such systemic failures as a fact of life, and means that 
individuals are vulnerable to the failures of governance while also being responsible for most 
of their costs. Failures of justice, recognition, and status, along with the denial of these failures, 
breed resentment and create the conditions conducive to the emergence of terrorism.9 The 
individualization of politics and the resentment engendered extends to political violence, with 
self-radicalization becoming increasingly prevalent in terrorist attacks. 
Mohammed Emwazi (“Jihad John”), ca Nov. 16, 2014. 
Source: Islamic State/al-Furqān Media Foundation
ISIS Media
 CARGC BRIEF 5 2019
 Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania 28
Rather than isolated acts of disruption, terrorism is enmeshed within the fabric of global 
risk society. An appreciation of the complexities and feedback loops inherent in global risk 
processes is central to understanding the emergence of and responses to terrorism.
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A Lone Wolf in the Hypertext: 
Radicalization Online
Contemporary discourse seeking to explain “Islamic” terrorism is, in the English-speaking world, 
plagued by a profusion of mutually incompatible heuristics, just-so stories, and naturalized 
prejudices disguised as common wisdom. Perhaps most fundamentally, this discourse errs in its 
assumption—intrinsic in the very semantic structure of such terms as “Islamic extremism” and 
“jihadism”—that violent extremism, and the initiatory process of radicalization, originate in 
the historical and contemporary practices of Islam. Yet the figure of the lone wolf profoundly 
undermines this assumption. 
Case studies of lone wolf terrorists—particularly those who follow a pattern of self-
radicalization—reveal that violent extremism grows not from the specific cultural or historical 
practices of Islam, but from a general affect of sadism, thrill-seeking, and personality disorder.  
The lone wolf’s pathologies are only Islamically-inflected, often through an accretion of 
mediated encounters linking representations of violence, Islam, and the lone wolf himself.1 
This points us to the conclusion that in the case of these violent extremists, pathology usually—
perhaps always—precedes theology/ideology. 
The peculiar confluences of theology and ideology that accompany violent extremism such as 
this are no more technologically determined than they are inherent to the practice of Islam.2  
Nevertheless, the theo-ideology of violent extremists regularly bears the ineluctable stamp of 
those communicative technologies around which it has been constructed. This constitutes a 
second category of inflection, which must be taken into account. The extremism of highly literate 
individuals will bear the hallmarks of print media and its particular biases. The theo-ideology of 
violent extremists saturated in television and radio/audio reflects characteristics of post-literate 
orality.3 And those whose primary mode of interface is the internet and world wide web will 
bear features of the idiosyncratic, ad hoc logic of these technologies’ database-derived and 
hypertextual traits.
Pulse nightclub shooter Omar Mateen offers a good example of the latter, digital dynamic in 
action. The FBI has expressed strong confidence that Mateen was radicalized at least partly 
(which is to say, perhaps totally) online.4 And indeed, as we attempt to trace the contours of 
Mateen’s theo-ideology, we quickly come to recognize the clashing perspectives of a digitally-
mediated worldview; a babel of conflicting identities and ideals, at once facile and incoherent, 
obscuring a toxic affect bearing no resemblance to the conscience of the devout traditionalist, 
but instead to the criminal narcissist and the rampage killer.
No coherent ideology underlaid Mateen’s mass murder attack. Mateen would by turns claim 
membership in Hezbollah, express solidarity with al-Nusra and al-Qaeda, and pledge 
allegiance to the Islamic State. He was at once outraged by the application of American force 
overseas and infatuated with the power of law enforcement and the American carceral state.5 
The violent antagonism between these positions is not surprising in light of Mateen’s online 
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radicalization process. That Mateen’s peculiar theo-ideological inflection should prove so 
dissonant and on its face self-contradictory is the outcome and index of the media environment 
in which it coalesced—that is, the internet and worldwide web. 
The biases of the internet and worldwide web are the 
biases of the database and the hypertext, respectively. 
A vast reservoir of encoded information sits at the core 
of the ‘net, which is decoded and made meaningful 
by the user at the level of the interface. Without this 
“reading up,” data remains inert, lacking in significance 
beyond the fact of its own being.6 This reservoir of 
encoded information lacks an organizing “grand 
narrative” in the mode of, say, the data contained 
in the texts and practices of a specific denomination 
and branch of Islam. Indeed, the database’s 
assumption and reliance upon the user to decode 
and give meaning to its vast trove of raw information 
is fundamentally undermining to the very notion of 
grand narratives. As Mateen “read up” the contents of 
the internet’s vast data reservoir, he did not decode its 
information through a grand narrative of Wahhabism, 
Khomeinism, or some mainline practice of American Islam (reports indicate he was somewhat 
dislocated from his own religious community) but rather through his own affective tendencies 
toward fantasies of violence and power.
Moreover, the essential interface with which Mateen would have “read up” the internet 
would have been that of the commercial web browser. The world wide web and its network 
of hyperlinked pages produces an abridged expression of a hypertextual ideal, in which all 
significant data are linked, directly, with one another.7 On the web, this ideal omniterminousness 
is left unrealized, and any data point is made potentially relatable to any other at the whim of 
the web designer and/or user. As such, any point may constitute a rupture or beginning, a link 
or a dead end, producing a field wherein all points are potentially conterminous, and no path 
among these points is permanently privileged over others.
In a network of meaning wherein any data point is potentially juxtaposed to any other, all 
equivalence becomes false. We may reasonably speculate that the hypertextual path of 
radicalization is often experienced as a straying, arbitrary zigzag, where the rules of linear 
thought and logical conclusion are suspended, taking the lone wolf through illogical and even 
contradictory ideological watersheds. A capricious, dis-integrated multiplicity of personae 
emerge, figureheads fronting impossible chains of identity and belief whose links and pieces will 
never fit together.8
Omar Mateen
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Whatever theo-ideological convictions Mateen produced through this accretion of discordant, 
de-narrativized data points, they were but the “darker, emptier, and simpler”9 shadows of 
his pathologically disordered feelings and impulses. Mateen bore many of the traits typical 
of serial and rampage killers: a history of physically abusive behavior, experience as both 
victim and perpetrator of bullying, social anorexia, a fascination with police authority, violent 
ideation, and more.10 His radicalization was not the adoption of increasingly perverse, nor (to 
take a reactionary position) “pure” forms of Islamic theo-ideology, which ultimately compelled 
him to kill. If we must even use the word “radicalization” we must recognize that it only serves 
to describe the process of accretion and is not a motivator in itself. Perhaps this process of 
accretion does contribute somewhat to a killer’s deteriorating affect (the role of fantasy and 
escalation in spree and serial murder is well-documented) but the particularities of Islam per se 
seem to bear no significance on this dynamic. Radicalization, especially as concerns its specific 
ideo-theological inflections, is an ornament, not a motive.
Similarly, media are not the drivers of extremist theo-ideologies, but do often and profoundly 
impact the shape and structure of those worldviews. If we are ever to understand the 
phenomenon of violent extremism, we must develop a discourse that recognizes the vagaries 
and paradoxes inherent to its contemporary manifestations. Such a discourse must take into 
account the effects that mediating technologies make on the ideo-theological inflections that 
surround the acts of the lone wolf. Such a recognition, especially as it pertains to new media 
such as the internet and worldwide web, troubles the very taxonomy of the so-called Islamic 
terrorist, revealing the inconsistency and even incoherence of the “Islamic” theo-ideological 
inflection with which he attempts to justify his acts of violence.
We may reasonably 
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NOTES
1  Lankford, Adam. “A Comparative Analysis of Suicide Terrorist and Rampage, Workplace, 
and School Shooters in the United States from 1990 to 2010.” Homicide Studies, Vol. 
17, no. 3, 2013.   See also Ali, Saira and Umi Khattab. “East-West trans-mediation of 
terrorism and Islamophobia: Sydney siege and Peshawar massacre.” The International 
Communication Gazette, May 16, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048517707389.
2  For detailed critique of contemporary discourses essentializing “Islamic” terrorism as such, 
see Kundnani, Arun. The Muslims are Coming! London: Verso, 2015 and Mamdani, 
Mahmood. Good Muslim, Bad Muslim. New York: Three Leaves Press/Doubleday, 2005. 
3 These claims are made based on applied readings of media theorists such as Marshall 
McLuhan, Lewis Mumford, and Walter J. Ong to such cases as that of John “Yahya” 
Georgelas, Nidal Malik Hasan, and to the phenomenon of “jihadist” poetry. A detailed 
account of these readings is currently in progress, under the auspices of the Center for 
Advanced Research in Global Communication. It should be reemphasized, however, 
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that this claim does not posit a techno-determinative role for media with regard to violent 
extremism. Rather, by demonstrating the homology of specific communication technologies 
and violent, extremist theo-ideologies, this project intends to challenge the prevailing 
discourse of radicalization, which treats theo-ideology as itself determinative of and 
anterior to violent extremism. 
4 “Update on Orlando Terrorism Investigation,” Press Briefing, June 13, 2016. Online: https://
www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/update-on-orlando-terrorism-investigation.
5 Descriptions of Mateen and his statements are drawn from reports in the New York Times, 
Guardian, and the above FBI briefing.  
6 Azuma, Hiroki. Otaku Japan’s Database Animals. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 2009.  
7 Berners-Lee, Tim, and Mark Fischetti. Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate 
Destiny of the World Wide Web by Its Inventor. New York: HarperBusiness, 2011. 
8 For a discussion of the internet’s tendency to  foster multiple, disintegrated, and contradictory 
identities in non-pathological subjects see: Seibt, Johanna and Marco Nørskov. 
“”Embodying” the Internet: Towards the Moral Self via Communication Robots?” 
Philosophy and Technology, Vol. 25, no. 3, September 2012 and Turkle, Sherry. Life on the 
Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. 
9 Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Ed. Bernard Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2001. 
10 Fox, James Alan, and Jack Levin. “Multiple Homicide: Patterns of Serial and Mass Murder.” 
Crime and Justice 23 (1998): 407-55.
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Obsessive Regulation and ‘Biological Minimum’ 
in ISIS Biopolitics
The dramatic rise and expansion of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq, Syria, parts of Africa and South 
Asia, has generated much discussion about the group’s atrocities and geopolitical impact, as 
well as debates about how to respond to it—not just militarily, but in the domains of ideology 
and propaganda as well. Yet there has been little effort to understand IS as a power. What 
do IS’s practices, beliefs, and propaganda tell us about it as a form of power? And equally 
important, how has IS conceived of itself as a power? This article is an attempt to shed light on 
IS’s exercise of power, looking specifically at its view and treatment of women. For although IS 
has experienced reversals of fortune on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, its track record has 
much to tell us about its particularly radical strand of Salafi jihadi ideology and practices as a 
power. This is a power that seeks a maximum regulation of the lives of Muslim women, down to 
the minute details, and exercises extreme brutality by subjecting captured non-Muslim women 
to an exceptional state of violence and abuse where they are reduced to their bare biological 
minimum.   
To begin with, it is important to note that IS is at once a juxtaposition of the modern and the 
medieval, combining modern techniques and technologies of rule with medieval discourses and 
practices of power. Sifting through the pages of Dabiq, an online magazine that IS produced 
between July 2014 and July 2016 in such languages as English and French and targeted 
mostly at audiences outside IS territories, the picture that emerges of IS’s treatment and view of 
women—with respect to their behavior, role, and status in private and public spheres—bears 
the hallmarks of a biopolitical power. A biopolitical power is a broad designation that for the 
purposes of this essay combines elements of both Michel Foucault’s and Giorgio Agamben’s 
definitions and interpretations of the concept involving practices of biopower, disciplinary 
power, and sovereign power.
As a biopower, IS is an entity that displays an 
insatiable desire to control and regulate every 
aspect of women’s outward existence—from 
their bodies to behaviors and roles at home 
and beyond—thereby harnessing women’s 
reproductive capabilities and ultimately 
confining them to a power relationship in which 
they are perpetually subjugated to the males 
around them. In this regard IS can be seen in 
light of a Foucauldian definition of biopolitical 
power, one that seeks to take “control of both 
the body and life” or, indeed, to take “control 
of life in general—with the body as one pole 
and the population as the other.”1
ISIS billboard with verse from the Qur’an urging 
women to wear hijab. Raqqa, Syria, 2014. Reuters
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As a Salafi jihadi entity committed to a strict and ultraconservative interpretation of Islam, IS 
imposes numerous limitations on women, ordering them to fully cover up, “lower their gaze and 
guard their private parts,”2 and accept polygamy.3  It furthermore promotes procreation and 
child raising—providing future warriors for the cause—as key objectives of women’s lives. Much 
of IS’s preoccupation with women and their bodies emanates from a deep preoccupation with 
sexuality, an area that Foucault describes as a “crucial target” of any power aiming to manage 
life.4  IS narrowly focuses on the reproductive function of sexuality, obsessively erasing any 
associations with feminine pleasure. Its obsession with sex is evident in Dabiq, where Western 
women are admonished for debauchery and Muslim women are directed to adopt “chastity” 
and “honor,” insulating them from sexual temptation. But for those who dare to defy the rules of 
proper sexual conduct, IS exhibits its disciplinary side through grisly images of women stoned to 
death for “adultery”—corporeal reminders of the cost of ignoring the rules. 
IS AS A SOVEREIGN POWER
IS’s treatment of captured women reveals a different side of its biopolitics. Whereas in the case 
of Muslim women IS demonstrates a strong if by comparison seemingly trivial obsession with 
controlling individual and collective behaviors of the faithful, in the case of captive women it 
positions itself as a sovereign power with authority over life and death, determining the very 
form of life (or lack of it thereof) that captured women experience. In August 2014, IS raided 
the Sinjar area in northern Iraq, home to the followers of the ancient Mesopotamian Yazidi 
faith. What ensued has been described by the United Nations as an “ongoing genocide,”5 as 
IS is estimated to have massacred hundreds of Yazidis, mostly men, and captured thousands of 
Yazidi women and girls who have been subjected to sexual slavery.
Despite the universal outrage about these atrocities, IS proudly took responsibility for its actions 
against “pagan” Yazidis. The October 2014 edition of Dabiq contained the following statement: 
“After capture, in accordance with Shariah law, the Yazidi women and children were then 
Yazidi escapee from ISIS captivity. Source: Reuters
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divided amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar operations.”6  
Dabiq also boasted that the sexual enslavement of Yazidi women was a realization of “many 
divine wisdoms and religious benefits, regardless of whether people are aware of this.”7
Treated as spoils of war by IS, the women were pressured to convert to Islam, subjected to 
forced marriage, torture, and sexual violence. In dealing with Yazidi women, IS effectively 
suspended the laws it applied to other women in its territory, thus condemning the Yazidis to 
what Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben described as a “state of exception.”8  By so doing, 
Yazidis women were effectively reduced to “bare life,” the most basic and unprotected form of 
life. The concept of bare life was articulated in Agamben’s work on Nazi camps in Europe. The 
camp, in Agamben’s words, is “the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, 
in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation.”9  As such, a camp 
need not denote only something physical, but could refer to a metaphorical space where a 
brutal state of exception is enforced. What actually constitutes sovereign power—i.e. biopower 
in the extreme—in these spaces is not the physical annihilation of life as such, but rather a 
reconstitution of life reduced to its biological minimum.10 
Through its deployment of modern technologies of rule coupled with an ethos that is medieval 
and traditional, IS reveals itself as an ultimate expression of a biopolitical power, obsessed with 
regulating, disciplining, and determining the forms of life that women are entitled to have under 
its reign. As a key multilingual publication of IS meant to appeal to sympathizers and potential 
recruits, Dabiq provides interesting clues about IS ideology and practices, how it operates as a 
biopolitical power. What emerges is an image of IS as a power in charge, regulating the lives of 
those within its territories. Whereas with Muslim women IS is chiefly concerned with organizing 
their lives in private and public domains and issuing recommendations on chastity, reproduction, 
and appeasement of male family members, in its treatment of captured Yazidi women emerges 
the image of an absolute sovereign power that subjects these women to a violent state of 
exception and extreme abuse, thus reducing their lives to a bare minimum. 
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Mongol Hordes, the Khmer Rouge, and the Islamic 
State: Non-Modern Conceptions of Space and Time
Most scholarship and journalism about the Islamic State fail to grasp the true meanings of the 
group’s unorthodox relationship to space and time. The group’s orientation to territory and 
temporality is different from normative Western models both tactically and ideologically. That is, 
the Islamic State, when operating at its ideal capacity, traverses time and space. It is both any-
where and every-when. 
This means that the way we approach the group might benefit from a kind of reorientation. The 
Islamic State is not just a nation-state-building enterprise and it is not a guerilla terror group. 
Instead, it is sometimes one, sometimes the other, and sometimes both. It is more diffuse, nimble, 
and protean—by nature and design—than conventional modern nation-states. Our models 
need to account for these differences. 
One way to re-think and re-conceive the Islamic State is to use models that are either outside of 
or at least in opposition to Western frames. This essay does that by pairing the Islamic State with 
two conceptual forerunners: the Mongol Hordes of the Thirteenth Century and the revolutionary 
Khmer Rouge regime that seized power in Cambodia in 1975. The Mongols are relevant 
because the group operated in a non-Westphalian context where national boundaries meant 
little. The same is true of the Islamic State. Additionally, their modular approach to statecraft was 
not unlike the contemporary decentralized organization of the Islamic State, where national 
borders are blurred and troubled by strategic and technological innovation. The Khmer Rouge 
is a more contemporary case, pertinent due to “Year Zero,” a politically motivated reset of 
the national calendar and rejection of Western history. Both the Khmers and the Islamic State 
reorient themselves and their subjects to an altered sense of temporality that is strategically 
anti-modern and anti-Western. Their work against normative time is symbolic of a disorientation 
process in the service of their apocalyptic aims. 
FLEXIBLE BORDERS AND FUNGIBLE CITIZENS: 
THE CASE OF THE MONGOLS
The most significant period of Mongol power in Asia began in 1206 with the ascendancy of 
Chinggis Khan, who united a set of disparate, warring factions and formed the Golden Horde 
that conquered much of the continent during the time of Chinggis and his subsequent progeny. 
The Mongols were a mobile war-making apparatus; they never sought to build the stable cities 
of their Greco-Roman forebears. Instead their strategies and objectives were always being 
refashioned according to what was needed for success in battle, so that, for example, hunting 
for food doubled as military training.
This modular approach extended into statecraft—there was little that was discernibly “Mongol” 
within the group’s larger structure. While the group was known for their brutality in wartime, in 
many cases, they allowed conquered groups to maintain many of their customs, traditions, and 
organizational structures, as long as they could be re-made to serve their new masters. The 
group’s language, government structure, and religious practice were all either drawn from their 
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recently conquered subjects or constructed whole-cloth to serve the war effort. Even the term 
“Mongol” itself may be most productively understood as a modern depiction of a social order 
in which citizenship was fluid, not designated by the kind of nation-state frame we use today.
The Islamic State employs a similarly malleable strategy. The “Islamic State’s decision-making 
is opportunistic, adaptive, and dependent upon its leaderships’ [sic] shifting propensity to 
implement its ideology,” one analyst, Craig Noyes, writes, suggesting that the group, which 
purports to embrace the doctrinally rigid Jihadi-Salafist sect, is actually more adaptable than it 
tries to appear. “[I]t is only when Islamic State has adequate governing strength, or a decision 
cannot provide short-term organizational benefit, or IS’s ideological legitimacy and grand 
strategy are at stake that it pivots to overtly ideological decision-making.”1 The Islamic State has 
collaborated with non-Islamist groups for tactical maneuvers and propaganda purposes, all in 
the service of war-making.
Moreover, the Islamic State and the Mongols both used technological innovation rather than 
lines on a map to expand their territory in multiple places at the same time. The Yam, a set of 
roadways developed in1234 by Chinggis’s youngest son, Tolui, gave the empire its shape—
anywhere the Yam went was a station of the empire. The Internet might be called the Islamic 
State’s Yam—a space of flows where the aims and subjective reality of Islamic statehood is 
realized not at its interstices but at its networked nodes. Each computer connected to Twitter and 
spamming hashtags, sharing beheading videos, or pledging allegiance to the caliphate might 
be called territory of the Islamic State, which holds the potential to expand far beyond what is 
understood by contemporary conceptions of nation and nation-state. 
Mongolian calligraphy - Wikimedia Commons, A. Orkhon
The Islamic State… 
is more diffuse, 
nimble, and 
protean—by nature 
and design—than 
conventional 
modern nation-
states. Our models 
need to account for 
these differences.
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YEAR ZERO AND THE REJECTION OF MODERN TIME
The Islamic State also attacks and disrupts mainstream notions of time and the temporal. So, too, 
did the Khmer Rouge, a rebel Cambodian cabal led by the despot Pol Pot, who seized control 
of the capital city of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975 and declared “Year Zero,” a reset of time, 
history, and the outside world. The Khmer Rouge platform was built on an oversimplification of 
history that laid blame for the nation’s struggles at the feet of its Western colonizers; by re-
setting the clock, the revolutionaries contended that they could throw off the organizing system 
of their foreign oppressors. All holidays more than seventeen years old were forgotten; all 
schools were closed; most intellectuals were killed. The goal was to reconstruct each individual, 
atomized citizen from the ground up, convincing them that they inhabited a time before colonial 
oppression, when the great Twelfth-Century city of Angkor Wat—the nation’s apogee—was 
more than a ruinous reminder of a glorious past.
The Islamic State’s relationship to time is similarly political and complex. It, too, employs a set of 
rhetorical techniques that effectively reorganize time by constructing an ideology from various 
hadith (records) of the Prophet Muhammad from diverse sources, regions, and time periods.2  
“Modern” is a pejorative term within the group, Gregorian (Miladi) dating is rejected in favor of 
the Islamic lunar calendar, and the Islamic State seeks to operate every-when—existing outside 
of the linear telos of the “modern” west and putting various contexts to use in the service of its 
work. 
Khmer Rouge leaders sit in a train car in 1975; Pol Pot is on the far left.
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This study is not intended to be overly ambitious. Neither of the cases examined here could ever 
stand as a strict one-to-one comparison. Instead, what these conceptual antecedents allow 
us to do is to reorient our thinking about the Islamic State. Perhaps scholars and policymakers 
have spilled so much ink debating what the Islamic State “is” because “what” it “is” is 
complicated by its flexibility in time and space. This happens in large part because too much 
of our understanding, strategy, rhetoric, and policy-making is limited by a Western orientation 
to a non-Western conception. As Edward Said reminds us, “[D]iscussions of the Orient or 
of the Arabs and Islam are fundamentally premised upon a fiction.”3  The fiction, his work 
would illustrate, was an Orientalizing one, where the Orient was conceived within Western/
Occidental epistemological frames as pre-modern, backward, and unsophisticated. From that 
inaccurate and presumptively superior position, normative cultural understandings have taken 
hold in many Western contexts. The Islamic State in fact has its own context, and the time- 
and space-shifting of the group are products of its alterity as much as they are strategies that 
advance the group’s intentions.
If the Islamic State can “exist” anywhere one of its adherents is Tweeting, then we need a new 
conception of what a state is that takes into account its networked and dispersed “citizenry.” 
If the Islamic State can “exist” at any time, then a more robust historiographical analysis of its 
references might prepare us for what might come next. 
Drawing upon alternative epistemology is a way to emphasize the exteriority of the subject. 
Changing the orientation of our research upsets facile assumptions about the group, reframing 
the study outside of an Occident/Orient dichotomy. These cases help us to tap different wells 
in order to generate knowledge from alternative contexts and connective themes. Rather 
than getting bogged down in any of the ongoing debates around the Islamic State, this 
essay suggests attempts to generate new paradigms for understanding it, drawing from these 
intersections to create new pathways for understanding across time and space.
___________
The author would like to dedicate this work to the memory of David Giovacchini.
The Islamic State 
seeks to operate 
every-when—
existing outside 
of the linear telos 
of the “modern” 
west...
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The Islamic State’s Passport Paradox
Shortly after ISIS declared itself “Islamic State” in 2014, images of purported passports 
circulated online. In August, 2014, Swedish terrorism analyst Magnus Ranstrop tweeted a photo 
of four passports strewn across a table (Figure 1).  He found the image on an IS supporters’ 
website. They bore the group’s flag under the word “PASSPORT.” There were reasons to doubt 
the group sanctioned these, starting with the cheap, shiny laminated covers. The use of English 
and in particular an English transliteration of the Arabic word for Caliphate appeared odd. 
“Islamic State of Al Khilafah” is not an official name; it is redundant phrasing, basically saying 
Islamic State of the Islamic State. Most likely, these were a fan’s mock-ups made to express 
exuberance at the announcement of the Caliphate. 
That same summer, a different image of a passport with a dark green bound leather cover also 
made the rounds on social media. Its ornate, emblazoned logo and full Arabic script made it 
appear legitimate (Figure 2). One report claimed that IS had issued it to 11,000 citizens who 
lived near the Iraq-Syria border. According to Al Arabiya, the group was using a captured Iraqi 
government “Identification and Passport Center” in Mosul to create the documents as an effort 
to boost morale and solidify its rule.
As a militant movement aspiring to statehood—one that was capturing and holding on to 
territory, and implementing a legal regime—IS would be expected to furnish its own passport. 
After all, it engaged in the formal administration of travel consistent with modern statehood 
practices, issuing safe-conduct passes and exit permits for exceptional circumstances. 
Furthermore, IS built bureaucratic structures to manage the populations it conquered. A passport 
would supplement these official efforts to regulate the movement and identities of individuals 
within and passing through its territories. Also, it would symbolically supplant the previous 
documents of foreign fighters who burnt their passports to show their full commitment to IS and 
reject their old citizenship. However, IS never systematically issued these or any passports to 
its entire population. Neither the group’s captured records nor media reports have made any 
mention of IS passports since 2014. 
Figure 1
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Besides being a juridical and functional artifact of sovereignty, a passport is a material canvas 
for power to demonstrate its legitimacy. This gives it an analyzable communicative pertinence. 
In the first instance, the decision to issue a passport is a declaration of having borders that 
demarcate national territory and is a geopolitical statement of inclusion among the larger 
community of nations. It matters for burgeoning international relations since a country’s official 
travel papers derive currency from other countries’ formal recognition of the authority vested 
in them. Perhaps, since IS saw its borders as fluid and did not recognize other states, it had no 
such purpose for national documents.
Second, a state’s representation of itself is displayed on the passport’s cover and in its first 
pages via nomenclature, layout, and iconography. It inscribes a vision of its own identity and 
sources of legitimacy. This gives official documents an attractive symbolic power; governments-
in-exile (Tibetan Green Book), para-state authorities (Palestinian Authority) or deeply unpopular 
regimes (North Korea) issue passports despite their having little utility for mobility in the world. 
It is probable that this is an under-whelming motive for IS, which may see a passport as a 
facsimile of nationalistic states. 
Although IS had the impetus to release passports and the capacity to produce them, there 
may have been a deeper reason for not exercising that option: A passport foregrounds latent 
tensions in the group’s claims to sovereignty. Specifically, the first and most essential justification 
IS gave for its existence is a divine one, appealing to the “prophetic method” of declaring a 
Caliphate. While the religious sources, from the holy texts to the practices and sayings of the 
Prophet and his contemporaneous followers, offer a blueprint for a just Islamic authority, they 
give no direct guidance on the question of passports. A cosmic raison d’etat admittedly suggests 
their futility, but the group would have to construct a policy. Many within it would surely oppose 
the promotion of outward travel on theological grounds. In fatwa no. 48 (2014), the Al-Buhuth 
Figure 2. Purported real Islamic State passport.
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wa al-Eftaa’ Committee forbade leaving because it was “without gain for anyone who wants to 
travel to the land of disbelief.” According to such a view, passports serve no purpose because 
everything beyond its borders is antithetical to Islam.
In practice, however, IS granted many exceptions. It promulgated a policy, for example, 
that “those living in Islamic State territory must obtain a permit from the Diwan al-Hisba in 
whatever wilaya (province) they live in if they wish to travel outside Islamic State territory for a 
limited period of time.” This would be a temporary substitute for an IS passport since travelers 
would use their old passports for the time being. If IS matured into a settled state, and citizens’ 
previous passports were invalidated, it would have to have a national passport to continue 
such permissions. Although having no clear theological backing, such a policy is consistent with 
the second rationale and source of inspiration for the state: a historical justification rooted in 
prior Islamic states. In its formation, IS claimed to resurrect the line of rightly governing Caliphs. 
While they deemed most historic Muslim rulers corrupt, even the Caliphs whom IS claimed to 
succeed gave out travel documents akin to passports; they facilitated the movement of travelers 
and others engaged in economic activity, diplomacy, and proselytizing.  Some of the papyrus 
passports from early Caliphates—including the early Abbasids—have been preserved. 
Since IS never concretized its territorial rule, and likely will lose it entirely by 2018, it is saved 
from having to decide about issuing a modern passport. The programmatic issuance of an 
official passport would have invited IS to clarify a coherent discourse around its sovereignty, 
reconciling itself as a divine, sanctified, religiously correct authority that is also historically 
rooted in an interrupted line of Caliphs. Islamic State’s officials may have come to see a 
national travel document as essential to the practical imperative of managing a state. This 
might alienate the religious purists within IS’s ranks, but it would find grounding in the desires 
of its fighters, residents and fans who celebrated mock-ups of a passport as a symbol of the 
state’s manifestation. As such, a passport, that small material artifact, could have forced the 
group’s first necessary compromise with the practices of sovereignty that still define sustainable, 
territorial political organization in the contemporary era.
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